Posts Tagged: Roger Scruton

philosophy / religion — No Comments
16
Jul 08

All you need to know about Roger Scruton

In a article for Axess entitled The Return of Religion, we are privileged to watch Roger Scruton defend a form of religion that nobody in the world actually practices – a common affliction for academic philosophers and theologians. He’s a pacy rider, but the wheels come off the wagon towards the end:

Yet human beings have an innate need to conceptualise their world in terms of the transcendental, and to live out the distinction between the sacred and the profane.

I don’t have any such innate need, and consequently his entire argument is falsified.

POSTSCRIPT:

There are questions addressed to reason which are not addressed to science, since they are not asking for a causal explanation. One of these is the question of consciousness. [Insert barely-understood and largely irrelevant reference to quantum physics to distract the punters here.] Look for it wherever you like, you encounter only its objects – a face, a dream, a memory, a colour, a pain, a melody, a problem, but nowhere the consciousness that shines on them.

It may be the case that the reason that we haven’t been able to “see” the consciousness before is that we didn’t have the right tools – in exactly the same way as we weren’t able (and in many cases, remain unable) to see the “great tapestry of waves and particles, of fields and forces, of matter and energy” that so impresses Scruton. It may be the case that we may be in the early stages of exploring consciousness, some years behind our journey of exploring the cosmos. It may be the case that consciousness will soon be laid bare, and that Scruton’s metaphysical discourse turns out to be a dead end.

On the other hand, it may not. One thing is absolutely certain, however – consciousness is very clearly and very obviously a question that is addressed to science. If I were Roger Scruton, I probably wouldn’t try to build my house of worship on this particular sand.

philosophy — 3 Comments
15
Jul 08

At the boundary of the species

Stephen Law posts an essay on Speciesism, Potential and Normality, largely as a response to the defense of human uniqueness presented by Roger Scruton.1 This is nothing that Peter Singer hasn’t already dealt with, but Stephen’s reasoning is entirely correct. However I argue that reason by itself is insufficient if we wish other people to reconsider their speciesism.

This is because this is not a rights issue in the same way as racism or sexism is – in this case the rights-holders cannot argue for their own rights, and it is therefore up to others to argue for them.2 This being the case, it is critical to deliver a stronger argument that the one than Stephen does here – most people will not be receptive to this reasoning because it goes against such a deeply embedded perspective, and so the case needs to be forceful rather than elegant.

In the comments, Stephen responds:

If you find sexism or racism wrong, my guess is because you find something like this principle plausible: We are justified in discriminating between a and b only if there is some morally relevant difference between a and b that justifies this difference in treatment.

If you don’t sign up to some such principle, why would you consider sexism or racism be wrong? (possibly you would appeal to some other principle) Sexism and racism are wrong, I think, because discrimination that is unjustified by some morally relevant difference = bigotry, and is wrong. And skin colour and sex are not morally relevant when it comes to most racial and sexual discrimination.

Trouble is, this principle then gets us into trouble with other species. Unless there’s some morally relevant difference, our discriminatory practices come out as bigotry – speciesism.

My argument is that the morally relevant difference is that most people consider that humans are the only animals with moral relevance, i.e. that only humans have the capacity for moral judgments. Clearly this distinction breaks down at the borders – a newborn infant has no moral capacity, as far as I can tell – but that is exactly why speciesism makes sense.

It is impossible in practice (and I would argue in theory, although that is a weaker argument) to set up a rule of sophistication that states exactly which humans have sufficient moral capacity to be considered part of the “moral community” and thus subject to moral considerations (such as the right not to be experimented upon).

If you agree that such a rule is impossible, then you must agree that we need a heuristic to decide who is included in our “moral community” or be paralysed by every individual having to make their own judgment every time they meet another person. The obvious boundary is exactly where it is at the moment – with our own species, since this presents an obvious and visible line of demarcation that has the added benefit of being an instinctive human response.

  1. I don’t think Scruton stands up to scruton-y, ho ho ho – see his recent piece on The Return of Religion for a particularly weak chain of thought. [↩]
  2. I am one of those people: I favour limited human rights being extended to non-human animals of sufficient intelligence. [↩]